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Abstract. We analyze in this section game-theoretic models of competition 
between telecommunication networks providers in various contexts. This 
analysis helps to define and understand the operators’ pricing and technology 
investments as well as the most efficient market rules by a regulator. 
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1 Context 
The Internet has moved from an academic network to a commercial and highly 
competitive one where providers compete for customers by playing with the price to 
access service and the Quality of Service (QoS) they offer. There are now different 
ways to access the network through different technologies, using ADSL, telephone 
network, optic fiber, CDMA wireless networks, WiFi or WiMAX among others, with 
different QoS capabilities. Moreover, the convergence of networks, where Internet 
access, wired and wireless telephony, television are regrouped into a single network 
poses additional economic challenges. In this situation, each provider has to adapt his 
pricing scheme in order to attract customers, to maximize his revenue and/or to allow 
fairness in the way resources are shared. Pricing has therefore been a hot topic in 
telecommunication networks during the last decade (due to congestion) and many 
schemes have been proposed in the literature [1,2,15].  
On the other hand competition among providers has received very little attention 
up to now. Though, telecommunication networks have become highly competitive 
and it seems primordial to us to deal with that competition in pricing models when 
defining the optimal prices, since competition may highly affect the results of price 
determination (while pricing in a monopolistic context generally means a single level 
of game between users, competition actually introduces an additional level of game, 
between providers). Some typical illustrations of competition are described below.  
For wired access, DSL users can choose among several competing providers to 
connect to the Internet.  
1. The case of wireless access is more flexible. For example a user wishing to 
connect to a WiFi hotspot may be located in a zone covered by several wireless 
access providers, and can choose which provider to use for the time of his 
connection. 
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The same user can/will even be able to choose between different and competitive 
transmission platforms: WiFi, WiMAX, 3G, wired operators, FTTx (Fiber To The X), 
with a possible combination of all those ones (the so-called multi-homing). 
Depending on the context, providers are or can be forced to share a part of the 
available resource.  
Our goal in this section is to deal with that issue. Indeed, we need to study the 
distribution of customers among providers as a first level of game, and then to focus 
on a second higher level, the price and QoS war among providers. We aim at 
summarizing some of the main findings of the French ANR project CAPTURES (see 
http://captures.inria.fr/), run in conjunction with Econ@Tel, whose main goals are:  
• To provide models and analysis of direct competition among providers operating 
on the same or different technologies (being WiFi, WiMAX, 3G, ADSL…) and the 
dynamics of those models. 
• To discuss capacity expansion for providers from an economic point of view. 
• To analyze retention policies that prevent users from churning, and how this can be 
controlled.  
• In general, to discuss regulation rules that could help to drive the system to an 
optimal situation. 
The key tools are telecommunication networks modeling, non-cooperative game 
theory and optimization.  
Figure 1 illustrates the type of situation to be analyzed with different providers 
(DSL, wireless, etc.) not necessarily covering all users. Those providers have to 
define their price (pi for provider i) at the largest time scale as a game (they can 
additionally play with capacity, QoS and other parameters). At the smallest time sale, 
depending on the offered QoS and the price at each provider, demand is split among 
providers. Those two games are strongly dependent: the way demand is distributed 
depends on prices set by all providers; similarly the price strategy of a provider will 
depend on demand distribution. What complicates more, even at the first step, 
demand depends on QoS, itself depending on the number of attracted customers. But 
we assume that providers play smartly by anticipating the reaction of users to the 
price profile (the so-called backward induction).  
This type of two levels game is called a Stackelberg game [14], where providers 
are leaders playing first and anticipating the reactions of users.  
 
Fig. 1. Typical two-levels model 
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2 Demand Distribution among Providers and Influence on  
Price War 
To model the competition among providers, we use the above two-levels Stackelberg 
game. The questions are: How to characterize the equilibrium in the distribution of 
customers among providers? Does it exist and is it unique? Is there a Nash 
equilibrium in the price war between providers? Recall that a Nash equilibrium is a 
vector of providers’ strategies such that no provider can improve his revenue by 
unilaterally changing his own strategy. If it exists, is this equilibrium unique and what 
can drive the system to a “good” one?  
There are several ways to represent the demand of end users, such as attraction 
models, coming from marketing theory (a well-known class being the generalized 
MultiNomial Logit (MNL) [3]. But for illustration purposes here, we consider a 
demand repartition coming from transport theory. In that case, each packet is like a 
car on a road, and its influence on the resulting traffic can be seen as negligible. Then 
demand will be split in such a way that for each route (at each provider), the 
perceived cost, made of the charge imposed on customers and the level of QoS 
provided, will be equal for each provider receiving some traffic. Indeed, otherwise 
part of the traffic at an "expensive" provider could be re-routed to a “cheaper” 
provider. The resulting equilibrium is called a Wardrop equilibrium [16].  
We start with the model and results described in [10], where N providers compete 
on the exact same domain, as depicted in Figure 2. Time is slotted and Provider i is 
able to serve Ci packets (or units) per slot. If his demand is di, packets in excess 
(chosen uniformly) are lost and have to be resent. Figure 3 describes this loss model, 
the (uniform) probability of transmission success and the expected number trials 
before success (from a geometric distribution). Following [13], we assume that the 
price pi at provider i is per sent packet and not received ones, a congestion pricing to 
incentivize users to efficiently use the capacity. The perceived price per received 
packet is then Pi= pi max(1, di/ Ci).  
 
Fig. 2. Example with 3 providers covering the same domain 
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Fig. 3. Description of the loss and retransmission model 
Users try to choose the providers with the cheapest perceived price. According to 
Wardrop’s principle, all providers with positive demand have the same perceived 
price P= Pi, otherwise some users would have an interest to switch, and operators 
with a price Pi larger than P have no demand (they are too expensive). We assume 
that there is a total demand function D that depends on the perceived price P, and 
which is continuous, strictly decreasing on its support. Total demand is also equal to 
the total sum of received packets. It can be shown (see [10]) that there exists an 
equilibrium demand d=(di)i and that the perceived price is unique at that equilibrium.  
Using this equilibrium on the demand distribution, providers play (by anticipation) 
their pricing game, trying to maximize their revenue Ri, knowing that increasing their 
price could incentivize users to move to competitors. The revenue Ri is the product of 
demand di and price pi. Under assumptions on the elasticity of demand (of absolute 
value larger that 1), or if there are management costs that depend on the managed 
demand at each operator, we have been able to prove that there is a unique Nash 
equilibrium to the price war, described by the equations below. In other words, at 
equilibrium, all providers play the same price, and that price is such that demand 
equals capacity.  
 
3 Capacity/Technology Planning and Pricing in a Competitive 
Environment 
Pricing is an issue for providers, but capacity planning is another, at a higher level: is 
it worth investing in capacity in a competitive network? This is even more true if 
congestion pricing is applied, i.e., if customers pay more when there is congestion; in 
that case it might be worthwhile to voluntarily have a congested network.  
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In [10], we have shown that under an assumption of sufficiently high demand 
elasticity, there is no interest for providers to lie on their capacity by declaring less 
than they actually have: they get higher revenues if using all their resource.  
In [11,12] we have even played an additional game at a higher level, on top of the 
two-levels game we have just described. The idea is to look at the investment 
strategies of providers, in terms of acquiring new infrastructures and licenses, in new 
technologies for instance (WiMAX, new 3G license, etc.), and to maintain or expand 
the ones they might already own (WiFi, 3G...). Providers are usually heterogeneous 
because they already own different infrastructures and licenses and have different 
costs. We have thus defined a so-called third level technological game where each 
provider i chooses the subset Si of implemented technologies (in a set defined as 
{WiFi, WiMAX, 3G}), resulting in a (multidimensional) matrix of revenues (R1(S), 
R2(S)) from the above game, for all combinations of (S1, S2), with S=(Si)i. We define 
similarly a cost matrix (C1(S), C2(S)) also for all combinations of (S1, S2) providing 
the cost for implementing the considered subsets of technologies. The goal of each 
provider i is to maximize his net benefit Bi(S)= Ri(S)-Ci(S).  
Several scenarios are presented to illustrate the best investment strategies of 
providers in games representing for instance an already positioned 3G against a rather 
WiFi-positioned one, and their relative strategies with respect to WiMAX/LTE. 
Another issue is at which maximal 3G license price a new entrant would be willing to 
implement this technology and develop the corresponding architecture. (Note that in 
[11,12] we have not used the perceived price we have described in Section 5.3.2 but a 
model without loss but delay at a queue and a perceived price sum of the price  
paid and a perceived delay cost. Though, this difference does not change the analysis 
in itself.  
4 Analysis of the Price of Anarchy 
It is well known from Game Theory that the conjunction of selfish decisions will not 
necessarily be globally optimal, and indeed can be worse for every participant of the 
game than some other possible outcome. However, by nature networks involve a very 
large number of actors of several kinds (consumers, providers, brokers), with 
diverging interests, so it is unreasonable to suggest that the network be centrally 
controlled to improve its efficiency. Therefore, the loss of efficiency due to selfish 
behaviors of actors cannot be ignored. This loss can be quantified by the so-called 
Price of Anarchy, recently defined [4] as the worst-case ratio comparing the global 
efficiency measure (that has to be chosen) at an outcome of the non-cooperative game 
played among actors, to the optimal value of that efficiency measure. If the price of 
anarchy is not too large, then this suggests that the system is run close to the optimum 
without the need for any coordination. Otherwise, some tools should be used to limit 
the efficiency loss (via the introduction of incentives in the network).  
Remarkably, for the model presented in Section 2 (and most of the models 
presented in the next part), see [10], the price of Anarchy is 1 when trying to 
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maximize the sum of utilities of all actors in the game, meaning that there is no loss of 
efficiency due to competition with respect to the case where all providers cooperate.  
5 Analysis of Specific Other Competition Contexts 
Considering the model described in Sections 2 and 3 again, but with a provider 
covering a smaller part of the population. It can model for instance a WiMAX (or 
LTE) operator against a WiFi operator as described in Figure 4. A proportion α of the 
population (i.e., of the demand function) is in the domain covered by the WiFi (thus 
by both operators) while a proportion 1-α is only covered by the WiMAX operator.  
 
Fig. 4. Game between providers, one covering a smaller part of the population 
Here again, the game is played as a two-levels game where the providers play on 
prices first, trying to maximize their revenue and anticipating the result of the game 
between users who distribute themselves between users trying to choose the provider 
with the cheapest perceived price, if not too expensive for them. Here also, it can be 
shown (see [8] for all details) that for all price profile, there exists at least a user 
(Wardrop) equilibrium. Moreover, the corresponding perceived prices of each 
provider are unique. At the level of price war between providers, using the user 
equilibrium to describe demand distribution, it is shown under conditions on demand 
elasticity similar to the previous subsection that there exists a unique Nash 
equilibrium (p1*, p2*) on prices:  
• If the proportion α of population that the WiFi provider can reach is smaller than 
the proportion of capacity owned by this WiFi provider C2/(C1+ C2),  then the 
common area is (entirely) left to the WiFi provider by the WiMAX one, which set 
a higher price and focus on the zone where he is in a monopoly. The equilibrium 
prices are 
 
• If on the other hand the proportion α of population in the common zone is larger 
than the proportion of capacity owned by the WiFi provider, at equilibrium there is 
a price war between providers, which set the same price, and share the common 
area. This common price is given by 
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Another extension, detailed in [7], studies the situation when each provider i has the 
capacity to serve Ci packets (or units) per slot, but when there is a capacity C that can 
be freely used by all providers. This basically helps to model the case when providers 
have their own licensed spectrum, but can use a free spectrum (for example WiFi) to 
send data when they are congested. Considering only two providers, the idea is that 
each of them uses his own capacity but sends demand in excess on the shared capacity 
C. If this capacity is overused then, there again, lost packets are chosen uniformly 
(which means for each provider proportionally to the amount he has sent to his shared 
spectrum). This is summarized in Figure 5, showing how the shared capacity is split 
between the two providers.  
 
Fig. 5. Network usage with two providers when there is a shared capacity 
Here again, the existence of a user equilibrium is proved, and the pricing game 
between providers can be studied. An interesting question to answer becomes: is it of 
interest to license spectrum or not? To see this, we can plot in Figure 6, for some 
numerical values, the utilities of all actors (aggregated users, also called user welfare 
(UW), revenues of the two providers, and social welfare (SW), made of utilities of 
users plus revenues of providers) at equilibrium in terms of the proportion μ=C/Ctot of 
shared capacity, with Ctot=C+ C1+ C2.  
 
Fig. 6. Utilities in terms of the proportion of shared spectrum 
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What can be concluded from Figure 6 is that licenses are beneficial to providers (in 
our competitive environment) because their revenues decrease with μ, while it is the 
opposite for user welfare. Social welfare decreases too, but if we put a weight a bit 
more important on user welfare, an optimal intermediate situation can be obtained.  
6 Other Competition Issues 
Other competition issues can be treated and have been dealt with during Econ@Tel 
and CAPTURES projects. First, we have discussed in [5,6] competition in the case 
when customers churn, i.e., switch from one provider to another (this phenomenon 
has a considerable impact on network provider revenues due to its frequency). To 
prevent users from switching to another provider, operators can use retention 
strategies that have to be studied and sanctioned if they keep from an efficient use of 
the resources. We analyze the price war and regulation procedures (sanctions for 
providers) leading to the best equilibrium.  
But competition is not only at the access provider level, it can be at the content 
provider level. The typical game is a content and advertising game (mainly how 
content providers earn money). As an illustration, we have studied in [9] two search 
engines (which could be Google, Yahoo! or Bing) in competition for advertisers 
(search engines usually displaying advertising slots when a search is performed), 
those advertisers having a fixed budget to split among search engines. The revenues 
of all actors depend on the market share of engines, their ranking and pricing rules, 
and the profile of strategies of advertisers. Here too, a two level game can be 
constructed with at the largest time scale the search engines choosing their ranking 
and pricing strategy, and at the lowest time scale, the advertisers splitting their 
advertising budget. Again the game is analyzed by backward induction, the engines 
being assumed to anticipate the reactions of advertisers. This helps to define the best 
ranking and pricing strategies in a competitive context, something not really studied in 
the area.  
Other important issues are treated in other sections of this book, such as the 
competition for security, not really dealing with content or broadband/access but 
rather something transversal, and the network neutrality debate (discussed in a 
previous chapter), which aims at defining the relations between access providers and 
content providers, those entities trying to deviate from a cooperative behavior.  
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